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Nos últimos cinco anos, antropólogos do Sul global passaram a considerar programas 
públicos de transferência de renda como uma alternativa tanto a políticas centradas no 
trabalho como a projetos nacionais de desenvolvimento. Esses estudos sugerem que 
subsídios hoje extrapolam o domínio das políticas sociais tradicionais e da burocracia 
governamental e apontam para um horizonte futuro diante da escassez de trabalho. Esse 
horizonte tornou-se ainda mais próximo com a pandemia de COVID-19, e com governos, 
entidades nao-governamentais e da esquerda política reafirmando a importância de 
uma renda básica universal. Considerando essas discussões, meu artigo tem como foco 
um programa de transferência de renda na África do Sul após o período do Apartheid, 
situando um relato etnográfico em relação ao desenho de uma política ‘progressista’ 
de subsídios sociais. Apresento a história do trabalho assalariado em relação à renda 
de famílias africanas, mostrando como as promessas emancipatórias de projetos de 
transferência de renda foram lidas como um risco a tradições e morais locais. Além 
da redução de esperanças políticas investidas nas transferências, examino o aspecto 
temporal dos subsídios, bem como os possíveis futuros que eles evocam. Ao considerar 
futuros que os subsídios possibilitam, concluo sugerindo que é prematuro afirmar que 
eles superaram o trabalho assalariado e a sociabilidade que o trabalho acompanha.
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INTRODUCTION
Government-funded cash transfers programs have become major points of global 
discussion amid the covid-19 pandemic. With governments across the globe closing 
borders, limiting air travel and imposing lockdowns to contain the spread of the new 
coronavirus, many economic sectors have slumped and individuals have become more 
economically precarious than previously. Cash transfers have been paid in many places 
as relief measures, but these payments have prompted questions about whether the 
latter can become more permanent economic measures, as versions of a universal 
Basic Income Grant. South Africa and Brazil, as countries with extreme inequality and 
where cash transfers were introduced as part of lef t-wing administrations over the 
last two decades, make good places from which to think about the political promise 
of cash transfers and their social ef fects. Indeed, it is thinking from Southern Africa 
that enabled James Ferguson to urge anthropologists to pay more attention to a new 
politics around distribution. This attention, he argues, allows us to see that these 
“sustained expansions in programs of social assistance has led to what could reasonably 
be described as a new kind of welfare state” (2015: 3). This is a new kind of welfare state 
because, as he put in an article leading up to the book, it “may have the potential to 
open up new forms of politics that take us far beyond the limited technocratic aim of 
ameliorating poverty” (2014: 130) and, as basic income, could be a source of value that 
“displaces labour”. 
In this article, I will of fer an ethnographically informed analysis of practices 
around cash transfers in the countryside of the province of KwaZulu-Natal. I will follow 
Ferguson in examining in particular the connection between welfare grants and wage 
work, in both its material and its ‘moral’ dimensions. I will argue that a consideration 
of both the particular history of wages and households in South Africa, accompanied 
by an ethnographic focus on the future, may require us to hesitate before accepting 
that such cash transfers have created the basis for replacing wage labour. 
The concern over the connection between welfare and work in democratic 
states is not merely a scholarly one. As a central element of the United States’ 2020 
Presidential elections, the campaign of hopeful Democrat candidate Andrew Yang 
focused on what he called the “Freedom Dividend”.1 This was a proposal to pay all US 
citizens US$1000 per month, independently of their household income. Yang argued 
that such a program would be funded for by a reorganisation of existing welfare, 
a 10% Vat levy, and a tax on the wealth and largest polluters. He also insisted that 
this form of cash transfer was not ‘socialism’. Rather, it would stimulate the market 
at a time when one-third of all US workers would have been displaced by increased 
automation. And he suggested that the dividend was important because, unlike 
previous rounds of capitalist-driven technological advancement, jobs would not 
be replaced. 
1 | Yang’s campaign is clarified 
in his website (Yang, 2020).
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Although Yang’s campaign has been unsuccessful, it was striking for a figure 
aspiring to president of the United States to be advancing the agenda of basic income. 
It is true that the US welfare system was once central to state policy, which sought 
to reinforce the labour market (and its assumed nuclear family) by assisting only 
those who could not work: the disabled, the war veteran, single mother families 
and the elderly. South Africa had a version of this too: for white South Africans, 20th 
century welfare policy also sought to aid those who could not participate in the labour 
market as apartheid sought to normalise and naturalise wage work as the basis of 
social reproduction. Black South Africans did not qualify for such extensive welfare 
provision, and were indeed barred from many wage work opportunities, although 
some limited assistance for those of retirement age and the disabled did emerge 
during late apartheid in the 1980s. 
Yang’s campaign was importantly dif ferent from the 20th century welfare in the 
United States and Europe, and represents a sharp break from the connection between 
work and welfare and the morality associated with evading work or relying on government. 
This morality was associated with cash transfers and food stamps in the US at a moment 
in which welfare loses its political cache in late 1970s and early 1980s. This moment pivoted 
the detrimental stereotype of the African-American “welfare queen”, who emerged as a 
site of fierce racism and right-wing political antagonism, and encouraged popular content 
based on the morality attached to avoidance of work and reliance on public resources. 
The notoriety of the “welfare queen” in fact prompted Kimberle Crenshaw in one of her 
founding essays on intersectionality, to point to this figure as exemplary of how race and 
gender discrimination operated together: in racial terms, Black Americans were held to 
be irresponsible members of society for purportedly avoiding work; in gendered terms, 
women were held to be sexually immoral (1989: 164-5). 
In thinking from cash transfers from the global South, thus, I will consider the 
moral and material terms of social grants, as well as their connections to gendered 
positions in the household. In advocating for universal basic income, scholars like 
Ferguson and Guy Standing (2017) point to its promise of not only overcoming 
dependence on wage work, but also for freeing households from the patriarchal 
terms of masculine wage labour. In South Africa, as I will suggest, policy makers of 
the democratic transition in the late 1990s were attentive to the gendered morality 
that permeated existing welfare policy, attempting to craf t a grant framework 
that did not af firm the virtues of the nuclear family or marriage. Yet the extent to 
which they have been successful at avoiding stigmas associated with the receipt of 
grants, and indeed, how much welfare can be seen to replace wage work, will be a 
key part of my analysis. In sum, I will think with the possibilities of distribution and 
new kinds of ‘progressive’ government practice, and engage with the following 
questions: how does this dynamic between wage work and grants exist and what 
kind of sociality is at stake for those, and among those, receiving grants? Do grants 
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manage to transcend twentieth century European ideas of social welfare, where 
state support propped up a labour market dominated by men, reinforcing it rather 
than replacing it? Does the ethnography of social grants show that their undoubted 
material importance has created new moral virtues around the value of wage work 
and decoupled wages from gendered expectations? And, finally, how does viewing 
cash transfers temporally, in terms of their role in the present and the futures they 
could serve, allow us to understand what grants enable socially?
MY FIELDSITE
My research is in the settlement of Glendale, where I did research for about six 
years, between 2007 and 2012. It is situated on the eastern coastline of South Africa, 
in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The settlement is about thirty kilometres from the 
town of KwaDukuza, which was previously called Stanger and is around 110 kilometres 
north of Durban. Located at the interior edge of the sugar growing region, the area 
gradually developed around a sugar mill built the 1890s. Glendale grew into a village 
around the mill in 1930s and 1940s and for most of the twentieth century was largely 
inhabited by the descendants of indentured cane workers brought from India.
About six kilometres further into the interior from Glendale lies areas designated 
under Apartheid as Zulu, initially named “Native Reserves” and later “Bantustans” 
during segregationist and Apartheid administrations. By the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Indian inhabitants of the settlement worked predominately in the mill or as overseers 
in the cane fields. isiZulu speaking workers – together with a minority of Africans who 
hailed from the Eastern Cape —did 
much of planting and harvesting – 
and many required to travel back 
and forth over the Apartheid 
border on a daily basis. During this 
period, the Sugar Company, Lonrho, 
invested in the roads of the area, 
ensuring that these were tarred, 
thereby connecting the village to 
Stanger and ultimately to Durban 
and beyond. The roads beyond 
Glendale, to the African homelands, 
remained dirt roads.
With the coming of the 
democratic dispensation in 1994, 
the sugar company donated a 
significant tract of agricultural land to the state to build housing near the mill. Well 
Figura 1  
Glendale’s location in 
KwaZulu-Natal, and in South 
Africa. Taken from Dubbeld 
(2013a, 499) Copyright 
Cambridge University Press.
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before the building work commenced on these houses, in 1996, the mill was bought 
out by a rival sugar conglomerate and shut down. That company, Illovo Sugar, retained 
most of the area under cane but brought in their own workers at planting and harvesting 
time, which continues to this day. They only employ a few locals casually, at the times 
when the work becomes the most intense. Following the closure of the mill, most of the 
Indian inhabitants of the area lef t, but building on the housing settlement continued, 
and 400 hundred houses were completed as part of the first phase of what has become 
known as RDP — Reconstruction and Development Programme — Houses, in late 
2001, with people taking residence early the following year.
A house was thus given by the newly democratic state to many who had only 
recently become full citizens of the country. Infrastructure in the area was improved, 
with the houses electrified and running water and outside toilets accessible to each 
house, and a local government sponsored rubbish removal service was introduced. 
Private buses and mini-bus taxis run to area regularly, many of them transporting 
school children to high schools or people visiting relatives, or going of f to grant pay-
points and supermarkets, as the area has only very rudimentary shops that are run 
out of their houses.
A few folks living in the houses are employed elsewhere, whether more 
regularly or in occasional piece work. Some do get seasonal casual labour on the sugar 
plantations, but most of the time, the vast majority of people here are unemployed, and 
this settlement, is for them, a place of a house but without employment. My informants 
estimated that unemployment here is between seventy and eighty percent. People 
rely on cash transfers: the child support grant given to care givers of children until 18 
years of age, the pension, of fered to those deemed beyond working age, with a few 
receiving a disability grant. As one informant, Thokozani, memorably put it:
People in Glendale live on pensions [grants]. There are no jobs. The Child Support 
Grant and the pension… you have a child and you get this pension… if you are a granny they 
will take you, and register you, they take you and eat your money.2
By way of introducing the settlement, there is one further important point to note 
about the kinship and family configurations. The roughly four hundred RDP houses 
are permanently home to one or two elderly folks, of ten with a grandchild or two, or 
a woman on her own with between one and three children. Sometimes single men 
inhabit the houses, and every now and again you might encounter three generations, 
but in those cases some part of the middle generation is always missing. If you spend 
enough time in Glendale, though, you sometimes see absent figures emerging. At 
Christmas, the settlement swells.3 It is especially young men who seem to return then, 
marking their presence by standing on streets, talking loudly, or drinking merrily. Even 
though the absent kin of Glendale’s homes, especially young men in their twenties, 
2 | In our discussion Thokozani 
continued with the idea that 
even after grant holders 
die, others might continue 
to receive their grants 
illicitly. For more analyses 
of the implications within 
households of continuing to 
use your relatives grants after 
their passing (literally put 
as “eating your ancestors”) 
see Dubbeld (2013b: 213).
3 | There is an interesting 
comparison to be developed 
with Zolani Ngwane’s 
(2003) analysis of the rural 
African household during 
Christmas during the time of 
Apartheid Migrant Labour. In 
a preliminary sense, a major 
difference is the incomes 
of returning men is vastly 
different: in the prior time, 
men had regular jobs, whereas 
today, income for these 
men is much more irregular. 
This further complicates 
men’s attempts to claim 
rural domestic space.
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thirties, and forties, do return to the village much more of ten than at Christmas time, 
they do not all return at the same time or with the same revelry. Indeed, these men 
are largely held to be absconders, regarded as unwilling or unable to provide their 
families with material support and of ten absent. But unlike men who were absent 
from their families during apartheid, these men don’t have regular work and are of ten 
without money: they move between piece jobs in urban area face long periods of 
unemployment, and occasional dabble in petty crime.4 They may have other intimate 
relations elsewhere, but there were seldom stories of men having established second 
families. Although some elders and women do want these men to return to Glendale 
on a more permanent basis and to assume responsibility for raising the children they 
fathered, many also believe that these men might disturb its residents. As we shall 
see, what makes this more even complex is a curious relation to the state itself, which 
is regarded as unnecessarily ‘freeing’ women from needing to rely on men, and of 
being responsible for the corruption of the social order itself. But before elaborating 
this in relation to local aspirations for the future and the positions of grants, we need 
to understand how grants exist in South Africa, as well as some of the social history 
of wage work and households.
SITUATING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL GRANTS: 
REINFORCING OR REPLACING WAGE WORK?
Very briefly, during first five years of the democratic administration, the 
government set a commission to work to develop a new social policy framework that 
would re-make Apartheid forms of social welfare.5 By the end of 1990s, the South African 
government of fered a far more extensive system of social grants than previously, 
providing support to the elderly, the disabled, and caregivers of children.6 Central to 
this reorganisation was the Child Support Grant, which replaced the previous “Family 
maintenance grant” and was given regardless of martial or familial status to the parent 
or guardian of a child. Such caregivers are eligible if they earn under R48000 per year 
(R4000 per month) if they are single or R96000 annually if they are a married couple.
The numbers of grants have increased dramatically over the last decade, with 
close to eighteen million grants paid out in 2018 compared to only three million in 
2001 (Statistics South Africa, 2018). This increase is even more substantial for the Child 
Support Grant, with one million grants in 2001 becoming almost twelve and a half 
million in 2019 (South African Social Security Agency, 2019). 
At a quantitative level, a major study has shown that social grants have improved 
childhood nutrition and school attendance among the poorest South Africans (DSD, 
2012). But if we focus on the relations between grants and work, a slightly dif ferent 
picture emerges. It is not only that the number of grant recipients are increasing, 
it is also that the labour market in South Africa is unable to expand suf ficiently to 
4 | During apartheid, the 
contrast between migrant 
labourers who were employed 
over the long term and 
regularly provided income 
for rural households, those 
who absconded from kinship 
obligations and settled in 
urban areas was clearly 
marked in many isiZulu 
speaking communities. The 
immediate post-apartheid 
period, Hylton White (2004: 
154-7) traced the appearance 
of a new contrast, between 
the absconder(itshipa), 
whose fault was selfishness 
not his work ethic, and the 
thug (tsotsi), who preyed 
on those who worked and 
occupied an unambiguously 
immoral position. In more 
contemporary Glendale, 
there are few absconders 
who are able to build a life 
through work elsewhere, 
and instead many men are 
regarded as falling between 
all these positions: sometimes 
returning with kin with some 
money but remaining away for 
long periods and sometimes 
suspected of criminal activity. 
5 | In the mid-1990s the 
government appointed 
the Lund commission to 
investigate family and child 
support. Following their 
recommendations, in 1998 the 
government implemented a 
reorganized welfare policy, 
offering a far more extensive 
system of social grants than 
previously, providing support 
to the elderly, the disabled, 
and caregivers of children. 
The Child Support Grant is by 
far the most common, and 
is a noncontributory, largely 
unconditional transfer, other 
than a means test for which 
caregivers of children under 
18 qualify if they earn under 
R39 600 per year (R3 300 
per month) for singles, or a 
combined income should 
not be above R79 200 per 
year (R6 600 per month) 
for married couples. This 
grant is R430 per month.
6 | The other grants are 
significantly larger than the 
Child Support Grant, with the 
Old Age, Disability, and Care 
Depending Grants at R1860 
per month, and the Foster Care 
Grant at R1040 per month.
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reduce unemployment. Even the conservative official unemployment rate has hovered 
between 22% and 27% of working age adults over the last fif teen years, with a vast 
number of people being classified as “not economically active” and thus not counted 
in the of ficial rate. As long ago as 2013, the South African Institute of Race Relations 
suggested that “more people are receiving social grants than working”, noting that 
less than fif teen million are employed, and even some growth in the absolute number 
listed as employed in the years thereaf ter still revealed that considerably more people 
were unemployed than those that held jobs, and that the total number of grants paid 
continued to exceed of ficial employment figures (Jones, 2013).7
The Institute of Race Relations claim is not the only instance or way that South 
Africans are raising the comparison between wage work and grants. On many occasions, 
this relation is raised as a matter of the anxiety of how grants should be funded, which 
stresses how taxpayers—whose income arises predominately but not exclusively 
from formal wage work—might be able to pay for growing numbers on welfare. For 
instance, some conservative economists argue that the South African economy is 
already massively redistributive, transferring money from skilled workers to those who 
were unskilled and un-employable, and thus suggesting the state grant expenditure 
cannot grow without a growth in the labour market, or without even higher tax burden 
being placed on those earning wages (Hlatshaneni, 2017). Despite these uncertainties 
regarding the government’s capacity to pay for grants during the covid-19 lockdown, the 
government did manage to of fer an additional amount of R300 for every child support 
grant in May and an unemployed grant of R350 per month from May to October.8 
Despite this latter grant, revised social grant policy has not explicitly sought to 
address unemployment, repeating, as Jeremy Seekings (2008) has argued, an older 
European social welfare idea of “just dessert”, rewarding only those whose ability to 
work is directly compromised rather than acknowledging that full employment is 
unattainable. That is, even if social grants in South Africa have had the ef fect in practice 
of ameliorating poverty for many, including leading to improved childhood nutrition 
and school attendance, until the covid-19 lockdown, there was no acknowledgment 
from the government that they ought to be responsible for the unemployed. 
But until now, there has also not been a popular demand for a universal basic 
income grant. Liz Fouksman’s (np) recent research traces popular sentiments among 
the urban poor around dif ferences between grants, decent work and so-called “bullshit 
jobs”. For Fouksman, a moral logic around just dessert is not only a state discourse, 
with many in urban poor regarding decent work as a goal and financial reward of such 
labour a just outcome, and of greater moral worth than government cash transfers. 
To some extent, both Seekings and Fouksman show how social grants in South Africa, 
whether as policy or as lived, do not manage to overcome the value of wage work, with 
distinctions emerging between certain forms of wage work as a goal for individuals 
against social grants, which hold far less prestige. 
7 | As caregivers can receive 
more than one Child Support 
Grant, in 2013 it was the case 
that the total number of grants 
exceeded the total number of 
those formally employed, even 
if this did not immediately 
mean that more people were 
receiving grants than those 
employed. By 2016, however, 
the SAIRR report notes that 
“there were 15 545 000 people 
with jobs in SA, while 17 094 331 
people were receiving social 
grants.” (Hlatshaneni, 2017).
8 | For Child Support Grant 
recipients, between June and 
October, a flat increase of 
R500 was paid to households 
regardless of how many 
children in the household were 
being supported by the grant. 
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From the vantage point of more rural setting than Fouksman’s study, I will 
suggest that the moral distinction between holding a job and receiving a grant also 
exists and expresses a particular gendered character that in some respects mirrors the 
stigmatization of the “welfare queen” in the United States, even as popular antagonism 
is of ten projected onto the government itself. Interestingly, though, while the policy 
of putting money directly in the hand of care-givers can be considered part of a 
“neoliberalisation of the state,” for those in Glendale it is government that is blamed 
for its social ef fects rather than on individuals, whether errant men or grant-receiving 
women. Indeed, as I will show, grants become a site for a debate over the future, what 
the state’s role will be, and how receiving cash transfer as opposed to holding a waged 
position might shape how the future can be imagined and how the present is lived. 
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF MIGRANT WAGES AND HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION
To understand the ef fects of the grant and its relationship to work in Glendale, 
we need to know more than about changes in the post-apartheid welfare policy. In 
the South African countryside, the social history of wages in the region grounds the 
connections between money, households and futures. Wage labour was perhaps one 
of the most studied dimensions of the lives of black South Africans in the twentieth 
century. In the 1970s and 1980s, many Marxist-inspired social scientists inspired the 
reconsideration and rewriting of late 19th and 20th century South African history as 
an expression of class domination, where capitalism grew in South Africa from the 
immense profits secured through the ultra-exploitation of black men made into a proto-
working class (Wolpe, 1972; Marks & Trapido, 1979; Morris, 1976; for an engagement 
with some of this literature, see Dubbeld, 2019). Known as Marxist revisionists, they 
analysed how the racist state served to protect such exploitation and secure whites as 
a protected bourgeois class. This approach emphasized how African households were 
compelled by colonial authorities at the end of nineteenth century to pay tax and thus 
force men into wage labour. While these scholars pointed to the resistance that this 
produced, later historical studies showed how wages earned by young men allowed 
them to challenge the authority of their fathers over the household and in deciding their 
marriage partners (Carton, 2000; Harries, 1996). These analyses ultimately pointed to 
how wages became a solvent of traditional African social bonds, making the possession 
of this money the basis of new terms of marriage negotiation and household authority. 
Kinship was thus understood as becoming functional to capitalist exploitation, but no 
longer organized society, which was dominated by money, and for Africans, earned 
through a racist, ultra-exploitative form of wage labour. 
However, anthropological scholarship that relied on fieldwork undertaken in 
the 1980s and 1990s contested the linearity of such accounts, showing how “tradition” 
instead remained a fertile notion “to think with”. This came in the context of wage 
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earners of ten demonstrating less interest in becoming an urban working class than in 
investing cash in rural homes and property as a means of securing social reproduction 
and future. Hence Ferguson’s own very early work (1990) showed how migrant men 
continued to invest in cattle af ter a drought made it appear economically irrational 
to do. What he identified as form of “bovine mystique” revealed how wages spent 
on cattle secured privilege in homesteads even when cattle proved to be insecure 
investments. More recently, Hylton White (2010) showed how migrants continue to 
use their wages as investments in building homesteads to enabled men to die properly, 
and so become honourable spirits. 
There are two ways this literature of fers an alternative interpretation of wages. 
First, I want to point out that wages are used by men in Glendale to purchase privilege in 
their households and, to use Ferguson’s term, a “counter-distributional” economy happens 
in the home with men investing their wages in cattle that women cannot access. While 
some portion of their income was surely distributed into households, those working 
considered themselves as having a right to much greater share of their wages than their 
female partners or children, a greater share with was bound up with sustaining the 
hierarchy of the home. In another words, money was not just money: money as a wage 
earned by some enabled certain kinds of distribution and foreclosed others. 
The second point is that the money that men kept back from the household is 
particularly oriented towards their futures, insofar as they are used to ensure their 
exclusive use in retirement or in death. We could say, perhaps not unlike The Protestant 
Ethic (Weber, 1930), that for these men, as oppressive as work was when considered 
structurally, its regularity and security created future-oriented subjects concerned 
with planning their destinies (even if such planning in Weber was a paradoxical 
psychological product: an attempt to create certainty amid the absolute uncertainty 
of predestination). 
I will show below how both household distribution and future-oriented action 
become serious questions for those receiving grants in Glendale. I will argue that these 
questions complicate our consideration of the replacement of wages by welfare grants 
at economic, social and conceptual levels. Ferguson’s (2015) rendering of the conditions 
which render cash transfers political and enable new possibilities for distribution begins 
with the transformation in the demand for labour, from what he calls labour scarcity 
to a massive labour surplus. While he accepts to the revisionist Marxist account -- that 
capitalists were able to pay lower wages because the state prevented African families 
from living in cities and thus in ef fect rural African families thus subsidized capitalist 
profits – did describe relations for much of the twentieth century, he argues that this 
kind of analysis of value has little relevance in the present. He contends that this is a 
moment when “a restructured capitalism has ever less need for the ready supply of 
low-wage, low-skilled labourers than the migrant labour system generated, and thus 
that marginalization and impoverishment of so many is “a sign of their very limited 
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relevance to capital at any scale”, and therefore that the attempt to develop an analysis 
from the exploitation of labour has limited analytical purchase (Ferguson, 2015: 10). 
Ferguson’s point then, is that as work has become scarce, so the reach of accounts 
of capitalism in describing the lives of poor South Africans has been exhausted. This is 
central to his argument, and for him needs to be pushed even further by overcoming 
our patriarchal preoccupation with men as workers through extending the grant to 
all unemployed. But, as I will describe below, it is less clear from Glendale that welfare 
will establish equality in households, whether in its current form or in the ideal version 
that Ferguson is urging us to adopt. And while he is correct that an analysis focuses on 
exploitation cannot account for those outside wage labour and receiving grants, my 
analysis will point to ways in which capitalist forms of value may continue to play a role 
in the lives of people who are unable to work - of fering aspirations that orient their 
practice towards building a future that seeks to secure rather than to surpass wage work. 
DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION AND THE SOCIALITY OF SOCIAL GRANTS 
In Glendale, the settlement that I described at the outset, most live in government 
houses, rely on government infrastructure and where many rely on government grants 
rather than wages. The distribution of the grant here has resulted in women with 
young children a measure of independence from men and elders, and many can live 
independently of men. As I have already noted, men, by contrast, attempt to avoid 
their dependence on women, with many more erratic residents of the settlement, 
of ten leaving to try and find bits of work in larger centres outside the settlement. 
This pattern is not entirely unique to Glendale. In nearby, more urbanized Mandeni, 
Mark Hunter (2010) noted a range of precarious practices that have emerged in the 
‘domestic sphere’, emphasizing the changing character of sexual relations and the 
growing (relative) independence of women.
It has not followed from this material fact that people have adopted new moral 
horizons or regard themselves as earning shares. Many see the grant as closely tied to 
the state and to their experience as democracy. Some in the settlement read the social 
and economic transformation since democracy as inadequate, with grants woefully 
inadequate to address material needs, as many are very poor and ill in the settlement, 
even if they have houses and electricity. Indeed, their common refrain was that more 
comprehensive interventions from the state are required, most powerfully, that the 
government finds them employment. Crucial here is that infrastructure or grants 
was regarded as kind of immediate aid, and accepted as some degree of help, but 
was not seen as a ‘solution’ that people imagined the building of a mall and creation 
of employment opportunities would of fer.
Other people felt the changes the government made af ter apartheid were in the 
wrong direction, supporting the rights of children against parents, protecting criminals 
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against honest citizens, and undermining the moral order (which they implied was 
of strong families headed by assertive fathers). For this second group, it was social 
grants— viewed as hand-outs to those who were not deserving – that corrupted the 
moral codes of the respectable house by providing younger mothers with a measure 
of autonomy from men and from elders. In a curious way, some in the settlement, 
including some women, repeated a version of Welfare Queen trope from the United 
States, blaming the state for subsidizing the irresponsible behaviour of young women 
who ought to have followed a more respectable path to adulthood, including listening to 
their elders and finding wage work. Here, unlike in the United States, they were derided 
for not being proper mothers—insofar as they were unable to keep relationships 
together—and for not being proper youth—insofar as they were willing to refuse their 
own parental care. Here, again, it was the democratic state whose grant policy did 
not aid appropriately— working against what was regarded locally as a normal—i.e. 
patriarchal – order of society. 
We might say that social grants provided a register through which people in 
Glendale spoke of community and morality in much the same way wage work does or 
did. Of course, some, like Dodakazi, a younger woman with a child who is able, through 
the grant and the house to live independently of her parents and the estranged father 
of her child, do recognize the value of grants in transforming their lives. I will return to 
her later. For now, I want to dwell on how we understand the ambivalence many people 
in Glendale feel towards grants. For one thing, it is clear here that the absence of wage 
work and the presence of grants has not transformed moral languages around the 
value of paid and unpaid work. Men without wage work are regarded as without value, 
as ineligible for marriage. Some people in the settlement say that the government has 
replaced men, and it is as if they are married to them. And this sentiment, of men being 
regarded not only as economically but also as socially superfluous due to their lack of 
work and the government becoming women’s spouses, as Leslie Bank (2011) has discussed 
in his ethnography of East London and its townships, is not confined only to Glendale. 
This leads me to suggest that these men experience a kind of double superfluidity, 
largely unable to find long-term wage work and from secure positions in households. 
Indeed, adult men who are not eligible for the pension grant and remain in the 
settlement claim to feel restless, and as having to find something, so as not to let 
their families down. This sense of moral responsibility for material provision almost 
seems to be a condition of adulthood for men here, as if not being able to provide 
means that these men remain boys socially.
Certainly, at the level of policy, we could argue that the transformation from wage 
work to welfare could only be completed if grants were paid to all those unemployed, or 
indeed to everybody. This would remove the language of ‘desert’ that was foundational 
to British welfare policy of the 1940s, which has remained a feature of post-apartheid 
welfare policy, despite its other progressive dimensions. 
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But there is a further dif ficulty, with relates to the extent that work—even in its 
absence—remains recognized as a source of material and moral value. To illustrate: 
for people receiving the grant in Glendale, marriage is not viable prospect, because 
here and in many other locations in South Africa, marriage is a process that involves 
long term financial investment, and is not only an event. Such an investment is beyond 
those receiving grants, and it is not clear that extending grant to unemployed men 
would solve the dif ficulty. Indeed, marriage remains a preserve of the employed. In 
this sense, we might say that as astute as Ferguson is in identifying the patriarchal 
politics of wage work, it is not clear that even when many do not have wage work, such 
patriarchal norms disappear. Perhaps, indeed, such patriarchal norms reflect that there 
are two economies, one of the wage and the other of welfare, that the waged economy 
is a place of relative freedom to consume, and is still identified with the success of men.
To put this slightly dif ferently: how might a grant system that diminishes 
the importance of particular kinds of social relations be able to establish a sense 
of mutuality in which relations to a collective whole are emphasized, where people 
might actually be able to recognize their individual good in the common good? There 
is little doubt of the political importance of the insistence of the Lund commission 
that framed post-apartheid welfare policy that the nature of the family should not 
have any bearing on the payment of grants. But does the critique of the nuclear family 
end up erasing the possibility of recognizing any social relations at all, other than that 
between mother and child? Or in a grant arrangement like the one that Yang and 
Ferguson suggests, does it erase all social relations other than those between the 
state and the grant recipient?
I am gesturing here to how the grant might unwittingly produce an extremely 
individualized set of social arrangements that looks like neoliberalism and in which 
something like a collective belief in common shares—which Ferguson emphasizes 
can be an outcome of generalised cash transfers-- becomes more distant, rather than 
closer? I should add that, since the end of Apartheid and the massive expenditure on 
grants, all kinds of public care facilities, including creches (or childcare centres), public 
clinics and hospitals have been neglected by the state and hence that the grant system 
has become an especially individualized system of distribution.
In reading the reform of service provision af ter Apartheid, several scholars have 
pointed to the technopolitics of the contemporary South African state. Von Schnitzler 
(2015) focuses on changing regimes of water provision in Johannesburg and argues that 
the installation of individual meters tracking consumption have transformed citizens 
into individual consumers, bypassing the possibility for dif ferent kinds of collective 
subjectivities made possible in the anti-apartheid struggle. In dif ferent studies, Vally 
(2014) and Torkelson (2020) have demonstrated individualising, neoliberal dimensions 
to grant pay-out, with the latter showing how creditors have been given access to grant 
recipients and are able to claim significant amounts from small pay-outs to service debt.
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In Glendale at least, this individualizing system of grants has not entirely 
diminished people’s relation to the state into a technical matter: people regard the 
government as having a burden of public care and take seriously its slogan since 1994 of 
“a better life for all” (Dubbeld, 2017). Nor has it surpassed a sense of collective sociality 
here: expressed at times in terms of culture held to be collective, at others of a suf fering 
that is seen as more than individual, and finally, and perhaps most prominently, as a set 
of moral codes that refer to how relationships between partners, within households, 
and within society more generally, ‘ought’ to be conducted. 
One might characterise the governing strategy as combining some embrace of 
neoliberal techniques with a commitment to long-term collective social transformation. 
Of course, the state is neither fully coherent or politically united machine, and it has 
become increasingly apparent that the dif ferent divisions of government do not always 
work together practically, let alone ideologically. Nevertheless, the government’s 
policy commitments to progressive transformation cannot be reduced to mere surface 
discourse beneath which neoliberal economics flourishes. 
Having said this, it is clear that while social grants in their current form do 
put pressure on older forms of socialities characterised by extensive gendered and 
generational hierarchies, they do not necessarily yield unambiguously freer sets of 
social arrangements. Indeed, it is useful to read this in relation to Fraser’s recent 
work (2016) on the contradictions of capital and care, in which she argues forcefully 
that new challenges around care in the 21st century need to be seen in relation to 
the flexibilization of capitalism and to the erosion of public services. This means that 
although contemporary economic systems have promised more freedom and autonomy 
for women, they have also pushed the burden of care back onto households, away from 
public institutions. In ef fect, to reproduce themselves, households frequently require 
both men and women to work longer hours, and either to pay for newly commodified 
care work, or to neglect care for families. 
Another way to approach the ef fects of grants socially is to regard them not only 
in terms of how they articulate with already existing norms of social life in Glendale, 
but in how they might be understood in relation to local notions of the future. In this 
respect, I will turn to how government grants (and infrastructure) are regarded in the 
present, and how imaginaries of a better life approach them.
THE TIME OF SOCIAL GRANTS
Thus far, I have suggested that social grants expose a tension in households in 
Glendale, where men are expected to provide for families and do not have the material 
means to do so. With the income received from social grants—and the child support 
grant in particular—of fering the means through which households survive from one 
month to the next, this has exacerbated the pressure on men to provide and many 
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have lef t their homes in the attempt to do so, with casual employment possibilities far 
more likely in urban areas than in the countryside. This has lef t households somewhat 
fractured along lines of gender and generation, with men more transient members 
of households than others. If the transience of men from rural households is nothing 
new— now men are far less likely to provide materially than under conditions of migrant 
labour. This has led, in turn, to a certain ambivalence towards the state and its new 
laws and grants seen as providing much needed material aid, but also in contributing 
to a moral decay at odds with the government’s promise of providing a better future. 
This raises the temporality of grants, and the futures they of fer as material 
emblems of the democratic government. Certainly, we know from the earlier studies 
cited above that money was used in a dif ferent ways, and that certain forms of income 
that men earned was reserved for investment in cattle or the building of homes that 
attempted to secure the future of men in retirement or as ancestral spirits. But can 
grants be used in this way? Ethnographic research by Gregory Morton (2019a, 2019b) in 
rural Bahia, Brazil, has pointed to the ways in which dif ferent kinds of income, including 
money from maternity grants and Bolsa Familia is allocated, to dif ferent temporal 
projects, with shorter and longer-term horizons. How does this look in Glendale?
In the most immediate sense, the government grants received by elders and 
mothers match the temporal cycles of wage labour, insofar as they are paid monthly 
(although as we shall see, the future implied by wages and grants is quite dif ferent). 
For elders, then, timing of grant payments means that they can imagine a waiting that 
corresponds to earlier times in which younger men earned wages and saved up for 
building homes and marriages. For mothers, by contrast, the grant is something that 
cannot be saved or accumulated. Much of it is spent on receipt: on dry foods that might 
last the month, on, nappies or formula when there a baby to care for, on electricity 
and on pre-paid airtime to stay in contact with relatives and errant partners, and on 
servicing debts. For the adult men who do not receive grants, the payment cycles are 
monthly reminders of their incapacities to be adequate members of the household.
Despite the resemblance between receiving a monthly wage and a monthly 
grant, there are some other temporal distinctions between the two. First, on the 
wage side, permanent work is exceptional here, and becoming more scarce across the 
country’s economy as a whole. This means that the cycles of money from work is more 
constrained and uncertain. People spend a lot of time waiting for a job and then may 
work in short bursts or in longer cycles. But second, on the grant side, if the monthly 
cycle of payment does of fer a certain regularity, its longer-term promise is limited, 
both by the meagre amount of the grant and by the fact that there is no possibility 
for advancement. Whereas wage work promises a greater future, the grant of fers a 
kind of status.
I want to illustrate this point by referring to a few of my informants. Dodakazi is 
a twenty-year-old woman who is a mother of a three-year-old son. She lives with him 
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in a house that she calls her own and receives the child support grant. When sugar 
cane is being planted nearby she sometimes gets seasonal, day work administering 
pesticides to the cane. She carefully saves any money from this work, as she says she 
cannot save much from the grant at all. She receives no other income, either from the 
child’s father or from her parents. She chooses not to demand maintenance because 
she says they are estranged, he moves around a lot, and never has a regular income. 
She also does not rely on her parents, as she moved out of their home and into her 
own house af ter a squabble over her romantic choices, and suggests that she does 
not wish to be obliged to her parents, indeed, claiming that she would rather be poor 
than submit to her mother’s authority. 
She acknowledges that the government house and the grant allow her 
independence from her elders, but paused uneasily when I asked her about future 
plans. She wants her son to go to the best possible school, and to stay in school, she 
said. The primary school in the settlement would be okay, but thought that, by the 
time he attended high school, “things should change”. I asked her to elaborate, and 
she suggested that somehow she needed to earn money to secure her child’s future, 
and simply could not make enough in Glendale. I asked her about the informal trades 
some people run out of their houses, but she suggested that there were already too 
many of them in a community without much money. No, she affirmed, by the time her 
son reached high school she would have make another plan to find a better income, 
and to do this she would either have to reconcile with her parents and share costs, or 
move to another place with greater prospects of employment. 
Of course, many of my informants did have children in high schools and most 
tried to send them to a school twenty miles away rather than to the rural school in the 
neighbouring district about three miles away. Although the school further away asked 
no fees, parents have to buy bus tickets for their child every term, taking a significant 
sum out of their small grant. Nevertheless, a number of parents told me of how they 
would attempt to save for this ticket, asking grandparents and other relatives who 
might be receiving pensions for small contributions. 
Makosi, for instance, sends her granddaughter, Busi, to the high school twenty 
miles away, in the town of KwaDukuza. She says that “many children did not finish 
school, and are now in their twenties; so many people’s children are just sitting around.” 
Some, she says, even finished school, but remain stuck. She maintains that the only 
way to avoid this, and to find a future, is to study until a high grade and then at tertiary 
level. Stembiso elaborated this point: noting that
“children finish grade 12, [but] there is no job… there were lots of job opportunities 
during apartheid. There was oppression but we got jobs, and were able to take care 
of our families. Now school is not enough.”
People’s concern about educating their children revealed an important insight 
into the character of today’s labour market. It is not only that unemployment in 
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the country is extremely high, it is sharply dif ferentiated. That is, while it is almost 
impossible to find regular employment without a post-school qualification, there are 
lots of positions available to those with advanced or specialized skills. (Kraak, 2008). 
That parents in Glendale are willing to make investments in their children’s education 
using whatever means they can obtain reveals an awareness of the narrowing chances 
of work for the less educated. 
It also tells us about how people understand grants, and their particular 
temporality. For even when grants prove successful in achieving their goals of protecting 
some of the most vulnerable South Africans, people like Dodakazi and her son, people 
find that they cannot craf t a future through grants. Indeed, informants openly say 
that grants and the other government things they are given can do little more than 
maintain them for now. For life to be better, and indeed to realize the promise of 
post-apartheid government of “a better life for all”, people in Glendale aspire that 
their children escape from the government grants. That is, the only means for them 
to imagine a future is precisely beyond the grants that maintain them in the present, 
and towards finding a future in wage work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have discussed two aspects of social grants as they are received 
in Glendale: their distribution and how they are experienced in time, especially in 
relation to the future. While the distribution of grants af ter apartheid appears to 
ameliorate some of the hardship for the most vulnerable in South Africa, it has also 
prompted new moral anxieties around who the democratic state ought to be assisting, 
and in whose pockets these grants enter the household. If especially gendered and 
generational tensions over the distribution of money into poorer households is not 
new, the fact that this cash emanates from a state that has promised a break with the 
past and a better life has produced ambivalence and even anger at the government. 
At a conceptual level, of course, anthropologists such as Ferguson and Tanya 
Murray Li (2017) have urged that we take account of new distributional regimes. They 
engage such regimes both at the level of what cash transfers are currently, and what 
they may become as political possibilities in a changed contemporary political economy. 
While Ferguson draws on the genealogies of gift exchange in arguing for the possibilities 
of new kind of political arrangements af ter wage and production, Li has argued that 
concepts of development, replete with teleologies of progress that have dominated 
thinking about the global South from the post war period, need to be replaced by a 
concern with distribution. Distribution, for Li, can be the basis of a politics that addresses 
what she understands to be the detritus of contemporary capitalism, which has lef t 
ever greater numbers as “surplus populations.” For both Ferguson and Li, then, the 
promises of capitalist social inclusion through wage work, enabled by a developmentalist 
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economic framework, is anachronistic. Instead, we need to address distribution as a 
political question that can enable new kinds of social membership. And it is in the global 
South that we can look to these frameworks as already being engineered.
While I am sympathetic to the campaign of extending cash transfers to the 
everybody, my concern in this paper has been with how grants exist and the kinds of 
possibilities they engender. These grant recipients, their kin, and even the working age 
men from the area that are excluded from receiving such state support, encounter 
a capitalist market which not only renders them surplus, but provides them with 
an experience of the lack of means to achieve prosperity. Labour power, even in its 
absence, structures value in contemporary times. This is made clear when people 
consider the future for themselves or the children, they do not regard the grant, even 
if its distribution became unconditional and it was increased, as they means to make 
a better life. At best, it can provide a means for them to help their children to imagine 
a future beyond the state, beyond the grant, in wage work. Their future, then, as “a 
cultural fact” (Appadurai, 2013), remains tied to wage work, in a situation where wage 
work appears to be the only reliable means of upward mobility.9
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